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Abstract 
This essay draws on qualitative social science to propose a critical intellectual 
infrastructure for data science of social phenomena. Qualitative sensibilities—
interpretivism, abductive reasoning, and reflexivity in particular—could address 
methodological problems that have emerged in data science and help extend the 
frontiers of social knowledge. First, an interpretivist lens—which is concerned with the 
construction of meaning in a given context—can enable the deeper insights that are 
requisite to understanding high-level behavioral patterns from digital trace data. Without 
such contextual insights, researchers often misinterpret what they find in large-scale 
analysis. Second, abductive reasoning—which is the process of using observations to 
generate a new explanation, grounded in prior assumptions about the world—is 
common in data science, but its application often is not systematized. Incorporating 
norms and practices from qualitative traditions for executing, describing, and evaluating 
the application of abduction would allow for greater transparency and accountability. 
Finally, data scientists would benefit from increased reflexivity—which is the process of 
evaluating how researchers’ own assumptions, experiences, and relationships influence 
their research. Studies demonstrate such aspects of a researcher’s experience that 
typically are unmentioned in quantitative traditions can influence research findings. 
Qualitative researchers have long faced these same concerns, and their training in how 
to deconstruct and document personal and intellectual starting points could prove 
instructive for data scientists. We believe these and other qualitative sensibilities have 
tremendous potential to facilitate the production of data science research that is more 
meaningful, reliable, and ethical. 
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1. Introduction 
The data revolution has made its mark on academia (National Science Foundation, 
2019). Data science methods are becoming ever more broadly adopted and deeply 
entrenched at universities, with new data science options being added to rosters at a 
steady clip (De Veaux et al., 2017; Parry, 2018; Song & Zhu, 2017; Tate, 2017). Our 
universities are at the forefront of figuring out how to access newly available data 
sources, harness a new generation of powerful computing resources, and develop novel 
methods that take advantage of both.  
Yet, despite the tremendous opportunities of data science, our daily newsfeeds are 
reminders that the data revolution has also enabled applications that violate 
expectations of consent (Meyer, 2014), compromise public discourse (Granville, 2018), 
perpetuate discredited social theories (Colaner, 2020), sow confusion among decision 
makers (Davey, Kirchgaessner, & Boseley, 2020), and adversely impact minority 
populations (Evans & Mathews, 2019).  Addressing this situation requires heeding 
Sabina Leonelli’s (2021) call “to abandon the myth of neutrality that is attached to a 
purely technocratic understanding of what data science is as a field—a view that depicts 
data science as the blind churning of numbers and code, devoid of commitments or 
values except for the aspiration toward increasingly automated reasoning.” 
In this essay, we build on recent work from a wide range of academic communities—
including science and technology studies (STS); critical data studies; digital sociology; 
critical geography; statistics; and fairness, accountability, and transparency (FAccT)—
proposing that ideas and approaches from qualitative social sciences and the 
humanities can help address a number of concerns that commonly arise when data 
science is applied to the production of social knowledge (Bates, 2018; Bates et al., 
2020; Cao, 2017; D’Ignazio & Klein, 2020; Dumit & Nafus, 2018; Iliadis & Russo, 2016; 
Lindgren, 2020; Marres, 2021; Moats & Seaver, 2019; Moss et al., 2019; Neff, Tanweer, 
Fiore-Gartland & Osburn, 2017; Pink & Lanzeni, 2018; Richterich, 2018; Selbst et al., 
2019; Sloane & Moss, 2019; Meng, 2021). Broadly, we argue that quantitative and 
qualitative approaches should be seen as complementary, mutually reinforcing, and co-
constitutive of data science when applied to the production of social knowledge. Certain 
qualitative sensibilities—specifically, interpretivism, abductive reasoning, and 
reflexivity—can be combined with quantitative computational approaches to produce 
more reliable, more thorough, and more ethical research than would be produced 
without integrating these qualitative approaches. Qualitative traditions can provide a 
critical intellectual infrastructure for data scientists seeking to advance and extend the 
frontiers of knowledge generation and to address new, complex, and systemic social 
problems.  
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While computer scientists have begun thinking critically about the social implications of 
data science, especially with regard to bias and discrimination (e.g. Basta, Costa-Jussà, 
& Casas, 2019; Bolukbasi, Chang, Zou, Saligrama, & Kalai, 2016; Caliskan, Bryson, & 
Narayanan, 2017; Garg, Schiebinger, Jurafsky, & James, 2018; Gonen & Goldberg, 
n.d.; Sap, Card, Gabriel, Choi, & Smith, 2019), this development has been largely 
divorced from perspectives on the history, philosophy, and sociology of science. 
Scholars of science have long recognized that distinct epistemologies underlie different 
disciplinary and paradigmatic uses of data (e.g. Knorr Cetina, 1999; Leonelli, 2014; 
Rosenberg, 2015), and critics have argued that the problems with data-intensive 
computational methods have epistemological roots (Burns, 2015; Burns, Dalton, & 
Thatcher, 2018; Taylor & Purtova, 2019). Therefore, rather than starting with particular 
techniques that are typically associated with qualitative social science, we instead focus 
on a broader set of concepts that are intrinsically informed by particular epistemological 
and ontological positions common in qualitative social sciences—positions that seek to 
understand the contingently and subjectively constructed nature of the social world. We 
refer to these concepts as ‘sensibilities’ because we intend for them to intervene on 
methodology in a sensitizing rather than prescriptive way. In other words, while the 
three sensibilities we discuss—summarized in Table 1—may lend themselves to certain 
kinds of methodological practices, they are also flexible enough to be coupled with 
multiple modes of data collection and analysis. In suggesting practical methodological 
changes for better incorporating interpretivism, abductive reasoning, and reflexivity into 
data science, we join ongoing calls for data scientists to learn new skills and collaborate 
with social scientists and humanists in order to mitigate the harms of data-intensive 
computational methods (Moats & Seaver, 2019; Neff et al., 2017; Pink & Lanzeni, 2018; 
Resnyansky, 2019; Selbst et al., 2019). Our central contribution is to undertake 
translational work laying out a path for moving from critical data studies to critical data 




Table 1. Summary of qualitative sensibilities. We provide a working definition for 
each of the qualitative sensibilities discussed in this paper, along with examples of 
related qualitative methods.   
 
Sensibility Working definition Example of related methods 
Interpretivism An epistemological approach 
probing the multiple and 
contingent ways that meaning is 
ascribed to objects, actions, and 
situations. 
Trace ethnography (Geiger & 




A mode of inference that updates 
and builds upon pre-existing 
assumptions based on new 
observations in order to generate 
a novel explanation for a 
phenomenon. 
Iterations of open coding, 
theoretical coding, and 
selective coding (Thornberg & 
Charmaz, 2013) 
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Reflexivity A process by which researchers 
systematically reflect upon their 
own positions relative to their 
object, context, and method of 
inquiry. 
Brain dumps, situational 








The staunchest proponents of data science present it as a revolutionary new paradigm 
(Hey, Tansley, & Tolle, 2009) that, when applied to social questions, will reveal human 
behavior to be highly predictable and subject to the laws of “social physics" (Pentland, 
2014). “Who knows why people do what they do?" Chris Anderson famously asked in 
2008. “The point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented 
fidelity. With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves" (Anderson, 2008). One 
purported advantage of digital trace data is that, instead of being able to see only what 
people do or say when they know they are being observed, traces of digital interactions 
tell us what people really do in their day-to-day lives, such as where they go, what they 
buy, and who they talk to (Lazer et al., 2009; Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013; van 
Atteveldt & Peng, 2018).  
Yet much work has demonstrated that findings based on digital traces are not easily 
generalized. This is not only because of demographic skew and selection bias (Blank & 
Lutz, 2017; Hargittai, 2020; Lewis & Molyneux, 2018; Mellon & Prosser, 2017), but also 
because digital traces are so intimately entangled with their contexts of production that it 
is difficult for researchers to understand what exactly the data represent and to 
extrapolate their meaning onto the broader social world (boyd & Crawford, 2012; 
Crawford, 2013; Hargittai, 2015; Hill & Shaw, 2020; Jungherr, 2019; Jungherr, Schoen, 
Posegga, & Jürgens, 2017; Marres, 2021; Selbst et al., 2019; Zook et al., 2017)—a 
phenomenon that Offenhuber (2018) refers to as the “stickiness” of digital traces. For 
example, an analysis of Facebook data purported to show that “weak” social ties did not 
help people find jobs (Burke & Kraut, 2013), a finding that went against the grain of 
conventional wisdom and prior research. Eszter Hargittai (2015) later critiqued the study 
for not being circumspect enough in the interpretation of results by considering, for 
example, that perhaps Facebook is simply not the preferred vehicle for mobilizing 
superficial social ties.  
Digital traces enticingly appear to offer unprecedented, uncensored, unadulterated 
glimpses of social reality and, as such, their meanings are too often taken to be self-
evident. Dean Freelon (2014) conducted a review of highly cited literature from the 
fields of communication and social computing that analyzed digital traces of online 
behavior such as hyperlinks, retweets, and follows on Twitter. Freelon (2014) found that 
researchers commonly took these traces to represent complex social constructs such 
as influence, trust, and credibility while rarely supplying empirical evidence or 
justification for those imputations. Conducting research based on such assumptions 
without making careful, empirically supported, rigorous linkages between 
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conceptualization (e.g., the concept of influence) and operationalization (e.g., a retweet 
as evidence for influence) leads to limited, if not impoverished, understandings of the 
social world (Jungherr, 2019). Different approaches are sorely needed in a field where 
digital records are too often seen as an exact and objective representation of social 
reality (Resnyansky, 2019). 
Given the well-established problems with decontextualization in data-intensive 
computational methods, we argue that an interpretivist lens could address many such 
shortcomings and greatly enrich analyses of digital traces and other data science-based 
research of social phenomena. Rather than seeking truths that are universal and 
determinate (an epistemic goal to which analyses of digital trace data often gravitate), 
interpretivist social scholars probe the multiple and contingent ways that meaning is 
ascribed to objects, actions, and situations. For interpretivists, the ultimate question is 
not, “Can we predict behavior Y given condition X?" or “What factor X causes outcome 
Y?" but “What does context X and behavior Y mean or represent to the actors 
involved?”  
To illustrate the difference an interpretivist approach can make, consider a comparison 
between two different studies analyzing the use of bots in Wikipedia. The first study, 
titled “Even Good Bots Fight," aimed to measure the extent of conflict between 
Wikipedia’s bots, or computer programs that automatically carry out specific tasks 
(Tsvetkova, García-Gavilanes, Floridi, & Yasseri, 2017). The authors measured conflict 
by tracking “reverts," situations in which one bot undoes the action of another bot. 
According to this operationalization, the authors found a large extent of conflict between 
Wikipedia bots. The study concludes that “a system of simple bots may produce 
complex dynamics and unintended consequences," which has “important implications 
for Artificial Intelligence research" (Tsvetkova et al., 2017).  
In response to Tsetkova et al.’s paper, Stuart Geiger and Aaron Halfaker (2017) 
similarly looked at reverted bot actions on Wikipedia, but drew on an approach called 
“trace ethnography" (Geiger & Ribes, 2011) to develop a more nuanced characterization 
of that phenomenon. As Geiger and Halfaker (2017) describe it, trace ethnography “is 
based on a researcher learning how to follow and interpret transaction log data as part 
of the lived and learned experience of a community." This means Geiger and 
Halfaker (2017) did not assume that all reverts constituted conflict. Instead, they drew 
on their firsthand knowledge of the Wikipedia community and closely examined the 
trajectory of particular revert cases in order to understand what kinds of work the bots 
were doing in those instances and what their developers had intended the bots to do. 
As a result, the study identified instances of reverts where bots were not in conflict with 
each other at all, but were appropriately and uncontroversially executing tasks that were 
assigned to them in the context of ongoing changes within Wikipedia.  
Take, for example, a situation in which one bot adds an “orphan" flag to an entry, 
indicating that the article does not contain any links to other Wikipedia pages; when a 
link is eventually added, another bot comes along and reverts the original orphan flag 
because it is no longer relevant. Geiger and Halfaker (2017) used close examinations of 
such cases to develop various categories of revert activities and determine which 
situations constituted conflict and which did not. They found that the overwhelming 
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majority of reverts reflected bots not acting in conflict, but rather updating the content of 
Wikipedia to reflect new formatting conventions, undoing changes that were intended to 
be temporary in the first place or completing other noncontroversial tasks. Ultimately, 
they found that only about one percent of all revert actions could be construed as 
conflict, and they described how human bot developers typically resolve that small 
fraction of conflicting interactions.  
In short, both Wikipedia bot studies (Geiger & Halfaker, 2017; Tsvetkova et al., 2017) 
used computational and statistical methods to examine the same phenomenon. And 
both ultimately found at least some evidence of conflict between bots in Wikipedia. 
However, while one study (Tsvetkova et al., 2017) makes a coarse assumption about 
what certain transaction logs mean (revert=conflict), the other (Geiger & Halfaker, 2017) 
qualitatively explores those transaction logs in their broader context to develop a more 
fine-grained characterization of what they represent (revert=many different things). The 
contrast between the resulting take-aways in these two studies is stark. The former 
projects ominous implications for artificial intelligence run amok. The latter frames bots 
as constructive tools for extending human agency that can be properly managed with 
appropriate human supervision.  
What this comparison shows us is that interpretivist qualitative approaches can be 
meaningfully incorporated into data science. Promisingly, a number of scholars are 
increasingly exploring avenues for doing just that: Noortjes Marres (2021) has 
demonstrated how an interpretivist approach known as “situational analysis” (Clarke, 
2003) can be applied to data generated from computational technologies; Laura Nelson 
(2020) combines interpretive “deep reading” with computational pattern recognition in 
textual data; Simon Lindgren (2020) explains how the methodological commitments of 
Actor Network Theory can be coupled with computational approaches to produce 
interpretive analyses. The research community needs more development of such 
methodological hybrids that explore how interpretivist approaches can be wed to 
computational analyses at scale. Only then can we finally dispel the problematic 
assumption that qualitative interpretation is unnecessary for the quantitative production 
of knowledge—what Boyd and Crawford (2012) have characterized as the “mistaken 
belief that qualitative researchers are in the business of interpreting stories and 
quantitative researchers are in the business of producing facts.” 
3. Abductive Reasoning 
 
Those who prefer deductive approaches to generating knowledge sometimes critique 
data science for embracing inductive reasoning (Marcus & Davis, 2014) through 
approaches like data mining and unsupervised machine learning. After all, inductively 
searching for patterns in data without being driven by a theory-informed question can 
easily lead to spurious correlations (Mayo, 2020). Tyler Vigen (2015) memorably 
demonstrated this by showing, for example, that the consumption of mozzarella cheese 
corresponds to the number of civil engineering doctorates awarded in a given year.  
In reality, though, much of data science inquiry actually relies less on induction and 
more so upon abduction (Goldberg, 2015; Miller, 2010; Thatcher, 2014; Wagner-
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Pacifici, Mohr, & Breiger, 2015). Whereas deduction tests what must logically occur in 
order to substantiate a predefined theory, and induction proposes a de novo theory 
based solely on a preponderance observed evidence, abduction is often described as 
“inference to the best explanation” (Douven, 2011). Many people are passingly familiar 
with how abduction works from the beloved stories of Sherlock Holmes (Carson, 2009). 
Abductive reasoning updates and builds upon pre-existing assumptions (in other words, 
theories) based on new observations in order to generate a novel explanation for a 
phenomenon. As such it demarks “a creative outcome which engenders a new idea," 
(Reichertz, 2010). As Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce, 2013) has put it:  
"But suddenly, while we are pouring over our digest of the facts and are 
endeavoring to set them into order, it occurs to us that if we were to assume 
something to be true that we do not know to be true, these facts would arrange 
themselves luminously. That is abduction.” 
Our point is not that data scientists should start relying more heavily on abduction, as 
this mode of reasoning is already quite prevalent in data-intensive computational 
analysis (Goldberg, 2015; Miller, 2010; Thatcher, 2014; Wagner-Pacifici et al., 2015). 
Rather, we wish to point out that the field lacks widely accepted norms and processes 
for acknowledging, executing, describing, and evaluating the application of abduction. 
This is why media scholar Warren Sack (2019) recently argued that large-scale 
algorithmic data analysis necessitates the development of new rhetorical practices for 
abductively demonstrating the linkages between opaque computational outputs and the 
assignation of meaning to those results.  
Qualitative traditions can help in this regard. When using abductive reasoning, 
qualitative researchers have developed ways of addressing the relationships between 
prior assumptions, new observations, and newly derived explanations—something that 
is often sorely needed in data science. This distinction can be illustrated by contrasting 
the practices of ‘labeling’ in data science versus ‘coding’ in qualitative approaches. 
Take, for example, the common data science approach of supervised machine learning. 
Human arbiters ‘label’ a sample of data that will be used to ‘train’ a machine learning 
algorithm in applying those labels beyond the sample—a process that often remains 
opaque (Geiger et al., 2020). The application of a label implies the mere categorization 
of indisputable facts. Indeed, sometimes the process of labeling data involves tacit 
knowledge requiring little explanation, such as tagging photos of fruit in a bowl as 
‘apple,’ ‘banana,’ ‘peach,’ or ‘kiwi.’ But classifications are laden with social, political, and 
moral consequences, serving to amplify certain perspectives while silencing others 
(Bowker & Star, 2000; Gitelman, 2013), and in many cases, ‘labeling’ in supervised 
machine learning is informed by underlying assumptions that serve to advance a 
particular theoretical perspective, whether that theoretical framework is acknowledged 
or not.   
Labeling certain social media posts as hate speech is a case in point. In a recent study, 
Maarten Sap et al. (2019) demonstrate that many widely used hate speech training 
datasets contain a correlation between the ‘toxicity’ or ‘hatefulness’ of the language and 
whether or not the speaker used linguistic markers of African American vernacular 
English. They likewise demonstrate that studies which use these datasets to train their 
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models then propagate and extend these biases to such an extent that “tweets by self-
identified African Americans are up to two times more likely to be labeled as offensive 
compared to others" (Sap et al., 2019). In short, annotators who ‘label’ hate speech 
training corpora are informed by their own assumptions about what speech that is 
hateful looks like. If the annotator is white, they might find speech by other racial 
demographics to be ‘more hateful’ compared to speech from their own demographic 
group. These un-articulated heuristics guide how the annotators label data and 
introduce hidden biases into research. This is particularly important because machine 
learning algorithms trained on data that contain small-scale, latent biases can then 
amplify those biases when the algorithms are applied to other corpora at scale.  
In contrast, qualitative approaches that incorporate abductive reasoning would 
acknowledge ‘labeling’ as an intellectual contribution in itself—not a self-evident 
application of fact but a theoretically consequential process that should be described 
and justified in the explication of methods. The judgments that go into labeling data 
would not simply disappear as hidden bias, but get explicitly integrated into the 
interpretation of patterns that emerge through analysis. As a researcher codes their 
data, they work simultaneously to fit a piece of evidence into existing frameworks and 
also to update those frameworks as necessary to better accommodate the real world as 
depicted by the data. In other words, the labeling of data in qualitative methods (what 
qualitative researchers would instead call ‘coding’) is not a matter of mere assumption, 
but rather a systematic part of the theory-building process. 
One very common approach to ‘coding’ a corpus of qualitative data falls under the guise 
of what is known as Grounded Theory development. Grounded Theory spans both 
objectivist and constructivist approaches (Charmaz, 2000), but all take the 
categorization and organization of data to be not merely the matter of labeling a fact, but 
of developing a particular ontological perspective. While some Grounded Theorists 
(especially its early champions) claim this method of theory development to be purely 
inductive (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), we draw here on methodologists who acknowledge 
and embrace abduction in Grounded Theory (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Richardson & 
Kramer, 2006; Thornberg & Charmaz, 2013). This position recognizes that researchers 
are never ‘blank slates’ when analyzing their data. Instead, they have assumptions, 
expectations, and pre-existing theories about how the world works that are iteratively 
interrogated and incorporated into emergent explanations of their data. Because 
iteration is a key feature of Grounded Theory and most abductive qualitative analyses 
more generally, here we briefly describe a common, idealized procedure for qualitatively 
coding textual data.  
The process of iteration in many approaches to Grounded Theory begins with a round 
of ‘open coding’ in which researchers tag segments of their data (e.g. sentences, 
paragraphs, quotes, etc.) with summative keywords or phrases that typically stay very 
close to the language used in the original text. Next, there is often a second round of 
coding in which the researchers draw relationships between their open codes, for 
example clustering them together and creating several overarching thematic categories. 
This step is sometimes referred to as ‘theoretical coding’ (Thornberg & Charmaz, 2013) 
when researchers begin to draw on concepts and theories from pre-existing literature to 
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craft salient categories for their data. This is usually followed by another round of coding 
in which the researchers return to their data corpus and selectively apply the newly 
crafted coding schema to test and further refine it. In this way, qualitative coding entails 
tacking back and forth between pre-existing assumptions and emergent theories, and 
documenting each step in that process.  
Throughout these rounds of coding, qualitative researchers take great care to 
interrogate and revisit the appropriateness of their codes, frequently through some sort 
of collaborative process. Instead of generating a quantitative measurement of intercoder 
reliability to purportedly demonstrate the absence of subjective bias, interpretive 
Grounded Theorists often discuss with others why and how they made particular coding 
decisions in “peer debriefing” sessions (Barbour, 2013) geared toward arriving at 
“dialogic intersubjectivity” (Saldaña, 2009), which can be thought of as “agreement 
through a rational discourse and reciprocal criticism between those interpreting a 
phenomenon”(Brinkmann & Steiner, 2018, n.p). Through this process, a team of 
researchers discusses why each researcher arrived at the decisions they made and the 
team deliberates together on differences in their interpretations. This dialogue prompts 
qualitative coders to acknowledge and articulate the assumptions and logics they 
employed in developing and applying codes. Importantly, dialogic intersubjectivity is not 
limited to a practice among research peers, but can also be pursued between 
researchers and the subjects of their inquiry. One way to do this is through a “member 
check,” which entails sharing preliminary coding schemas, ideas, or analyses with some 
of the people who are represented in the data in order to solicit their feedback.  
While it is impossible to guarantee that participants in such dialogues do not share the 
same “blind spots” (Barbour, 2014), these processes nonetheless can provide important 
occasions for surfacing and recording the biases, assumptions, and logics involved in 
qualitative coding. In data science, such steps could go a long way in evaluating if and 
when it is appropriate to computationally scale an annotation procedure. For instance, in 
the previous example about racial bias in hate speech detection algorithms, the process 
of pursuing dialogic intersubjectivity among researchers or between researchers and 
subjects represented in the text corpus could highlight how the application of labels 
might rely on bankrupt misconceptions about race.  
If acknowledged and systematized, abductive reasoning is a powerful approach that 
allows for theories to be updated based on real-world evidence and helps scholars 
reduce the extent to which their own biases and assumptions shape how they measure, 
interpret, and extrapolate from a piece of evidence. As we have argued, part of the 
problem is that many computationally mediated quantitative traditions lack established 
norms for articulating, systemizing, documenting, and evaluating the process of 
abduction in their work. What if we thought, then, about certain data science techniques, 
like supervised machine learning, as qualitative approaches at scale? This means that 
data science researchers need not reinvent the wheel when grappling with how to 
soundly integrate and develop theory. They can and should draw on the expertise 
qualitative researchers have developed in exercising abductive reasoning and 





A variety of data science techniques, when applied to social questions, are commonly 
critiqued in academic scholarship (e.g. Mittelstadt, Allo, Taddeo, Wachter, & Floridi, 
2016), policy analysis (e.g. United States Executive Office of the President, 2014), trade 
books (e.g. O’Neil, 2016), and journalistic investigations (e.g. Marconi, Daldrup, & Pant, 
2019) for their potential to exacerbate inequality, undermine democratic processes, 
violate norms of privacy, and circumvent due process. For example, several years ago, 
ProPublica famously exposed that algorithms used in the criminal justice system for 
predicting recidivism are less accurate for people of color, leading to people of color 
being denied bail with disproportionate frequency (Angwin, Larson, Mattu, & Kirchner, 
2016).  
This outcome is plainly and profoundly unjust, and significant ongoing work in computer 
science is dedicated to making algorithms ‘more fair’ (“ACM Conference on Fairness, 
Accountability, and Transparency (ACM FAccT),” n.d.). But for many critics, tweaking 
mathematical models and algorithmic decision systems to make them ‘less bad’ is 
insignificant (Gangadharan & Niklas, 2019) if the larger social systems they operate 
within are inherently unjust or oppressive (Eubanks, 2018). As Cathy O’Neil (2016) has 
asked, why do we make predictions of recidivism in order to decide who should be 
denied release from incarceration? This question assumes that punitive measures 
against individuals are the most appropriate ways to address crime (to say nothing of 
the fact that policies based on these predictions would constrain a person based on 
others’ actions). Why do we not instead try to predict what kinds of programs and 
experiences in the criminal justice system lead to less recidivism, a question that stems 
from the view that criminal justice should be rehabilitative? Or why not use data to 
interrogate the basis of the concepts of crime and criminality? We concur with David 
Leslie’s (2021) statement that “Where data scientists, who view themselves simply as 
socially disembodied, quantitative analysts, engineers, or code-churners go wrong is 
that they are insufficiently attentive to the commitments and values that undergird the 
integrity of their knowledge practices and the ethical permissibility of the projects, 
enterprises, and use-contexts in which they involve themselves.” 
Data scientists should constantly be asking themselves questions about why they study 
what they study, what the social ramifications for their work will be, and what 
assumptions are going unremarked in their work—exercises that are core to a reflexive 
practice (D’Ignazio & Klein, 2020; Leurs, 2017). Although there is no consensus on how 
to define or enact reflexivity in qualitative research (Day, 2012; Mauthner & Doucet, 
2003), here we understand reflexivity to be a process by which researchers 
systematically reflect upon their own position relative to their object, context, and 
method of inquiry. For many qualitative social scientists, reflexivity means spending time 
thinking about and disclosing how their own biases, identities, experiences, and 
premises influence their work. This is important because, as Donna Haraway (1989) 
has demonstrated, our personal starting points (for example, our experiences of class, 
gender, race or ethnicity, training, entry point into a given project, etc.) can all influence 
what we study and what we find. Failure to acknowledge and discuss these starting 
points is problematic in all research. But such lapses may have particularly problematic 
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outcomes in data science, which researchers, policymakers, and industries routinely 
use to make sweeping generalizations about large swaths of society and to develop 
public-interest applications with particularly high stakes (Stone, 2017), as in the 
incarceration example above.  
You might be a data scientist participating in a competition to predict where crime will 
occur (National Institute of Justice, 2019) so that police patrols can be more efficiently 
assigned—something that dozens of U.S. cities have recently tried to do (Haskins, 
2019). Without being trained in practices of reflexivity, you may not stop to consider that 
you have embraced this task based on an assumption you hold that the criminal justice 
system can and should be made more efficient rather than fundamentally reformed or 
abolished. You may hold this view because you were not raised in a community with a 
historically fraught relationship with law enforcement, or because you are not deeply 
aware of the racialized nature of the current criminal justice framework (Alexander, 
2012). If you were trained in reflexivity, however, you would be equipped to recognize 
and critically interrogate these assumptions. Perhaps after engaging in a reflexive 
process, you would arrive at the decision that you cannot, in good conscience, 
participate in building such a system (Barocas, Biega, Fish, Stark, & Niklas, 2020). Or 
perhaps you would still decide to participate in the competition, but disclose in writing 
your concerns and/or the thought process that led to that decision.  
Recently there have been a number of promising efforts to establish reflexive norms 
within data-intensive computational practices. For example, the 2020 Association of 
Computing Machinery Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency (“ACM 
Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (ACM FAccT),” n.d.) 
featured several interactive sessions that introduced reflexivity and related concepts as 
a way of addressing transgressions in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and 
algorithmic technologies (Goss, Hu, Sabin, & Teeple, 2020; Kaeser-Chen, Dubois, 
Schüür, & Moss, 2020; Wan et al., 2020). In Data Feminism, Catherine D’Ignazio and 
Lauren Klein (2020) not only describe the importance of reflexivity and provide 
examples of data science projects that center reflexive practices, but also model what 
reflexive disclosure in research can entail.  
Here, we build on these urgent calls for greater reflexivity by exploring how this concept 
might be practically incorporated into the day-to-day work of data science as an integral 
part of the research method. After all, “reflexivity can be thought of as a method of 
meta-analysis,” according to the qualitative methodologist Annette Markham (2017): 
The basic position of reflexivity is analyzing the self recursively and critically in 
relation to the object, context, and process of inquiry. It’s more than just 
reflection, which is what we get when we look in a mirror. Rather, it’s like trying to 
look at yourself looking in the mirror.” (Markham, 2017, n.p.) 
To make that rather abstract idea more concrete, we present several suggested 
exercises that could be incorporated into data science practice, all of which have been 
adopted and modified from Markham’s (2017) web essay, “Reflexivity: Some techniques 
for interpretive researchers”:  
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1. Brain Dump. This is a timed writing exercise in which researchers reflect on 
certain prompting questions about their work. Examples of prompts that invite 
reflexive thinking include: ‘What do I already know about this subject?’ and ‘Why 
am I studying this?’ and ‘What do I expect or hope to find, and why?’ In 
answering these questions during a ‘brain dump,’ one should very intentionally 
avoid consulting or referencing external sources. Although the prompts may be 
similar to those questions that are typically answered during a literature review, 
the point of this exercise is not to identify ‘the state of knowledge in the field’ or 
‘lacunas in the extant literature,’ but to articulate and examine the ideas and 
assumptions that the researcher has internalized in their own head. Timing the 
exercise helps to ensure that the insights generated are honest, raw and 
unfiltered. For example, a real answer to the question, ‘What do I already know 
about this subject?’ might involve some personal, first-hand experience with the 
phenomenon of study. And a complete answer to the question, ‘Why am I 
studying this?’ might not hinge purely on intellectual curiosity—it may be also 
involve some variation of motivations such as, ‘because my advisor needs me to 
do it,’ ‘because there is funding to study it,’ ‘because this is an issue that impacts 
someone I care about,’ or ‘because this will confirm my worldview.’  
2. Situational Mapping. This exercise explores the researcher’s position with 
respect to other relevant entities, including persons, organizations, and objects. 
The goal is not only to surface links between the self and others, but also to 
expose variations and interrogate asymmetries that exist in these relationships. 
For example, the first author of this essay leads an internship program in which 
students learn data science through projects intended to have societal impact. 
Team members conduct a power mapping exercise at the outset of each project, 
allowing program participants to position each stakeholder (including themselves) 
relative to how much influence the stakeholder has over the work, and how the 
stakeholder will be affected by the conclusions the project produces. Importantly, 
this process frequently forces practitioners to acknowledge that they do not know 
very much about some of the persons or organizations that are affected by their 
work, which in turn prompts them to learn more about the positions and 
perspectives of those entities and to think about the broader ramifications of their 
work. 
3. Toolbox Critique: In this exercise, researchers interrogate the suite of resources, 
ideas, approaches, and technologies at their disposal—this may include 
everything from theories, to data, software packages, and methods of analysis. 
The researcher asks, ‘Am I using this data because it is the best possible data for 
understanding the phenomenon I am interested in, or because it is the data that 
is readily available to me? Am I using this method because it is the most reliable 
option or because it is an approach I am interested in learning? Am I using this 
programming language because it is the most efficient for the job, or because it is 
the most prevalent in my field?’ Answering these questions honestly can help 
surface the personal values and cultural norms that typically go unstated in 
research, but nonetheless shape it in powerful ways.  
These three exercises may be put to best use if incorporated at the outset of a new 
project or at key inflection points in the research process. However, another reflexive 
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practice involves carefully and continuously documenting the entire research process 
(Watt, 2007). This includes not only recording each decision point or judgment call (the 
‘what’), but also the basis for that decision (the ‘why’). This daily, reflexive aspect of 
research documentation can take the form of a journal, akin to a traditional lab 
notebook:  
Rather than erasing one’s previous thoughts, one simply notes new additions or 
modifications. Keeping dates on each entry can help illustrate how the 
researcher is changing through the course of the study. During this process, it is 
useful to ask questions of oneself such as the following: What led me to that 
perception? How do I know that? So what? Why did I conclude that? (Markham, 
2017, n.p.) 
We argue that the field of data science is fertile ground for incorporating reflexive 
practices such as those described here. Data scientists are often quite self-aware and 
self-critical of their methods and techniques (Hahn, Hoffman, Slota, Inman, & Ribes, 
2018; Moats & Seaver, 2019; Neff et al., 2017; Pink, Lanzeni, & Horst, 2018; Pink, 
Ruckenstein, Willim, & Duque, 2018; Ribes, 2019; Tanweer, Fiore-Gartland, & Aragon, 
2016). Indeed, this very journal, Harvard Data Science Review, is a testament to the 
introspection that has characterized the emergence of data science. Moreover, in part 
because data science relies on the circulation and reuse of data and code (Meng, 
2016), many academic data scientists have been ‘first responders’ (of sorts) to the so-
called reproducibility crisis by building a movement to introduce greater levels of 
transparency in scientific research (Nosek et al., 2015). This includes establishing 
norms for pre-registration of hypotheses, publication of data, and open access code. 
These important practices are intended to overcome the incentive in quantitative 
research to ‘cover up’ mistakes, dead ends, and research limitations (Brookshire, 2016). 
But these open science practices do little to address how a researcher’s own subjective 
experiences shape every step of the inquiry process. A reflexive stance acknowledges 
that subjectivity and bias are not aberrations that can ever be fully eradicated from 
research but inherent aspects of human inquiry that should be acknowledged and 
accounted for. As such, we see reflexivity as a complement to the push for transparency 
that is already underway in data science—a complement that is necessary to fulfill the 
potential of data science methods for understanding the social world. Feminist 
epistemologists have long argued that it is impossible for a researcher to erase their 
own subjectivities, and that it is only through acknowledging and articulating these 
subjectivities that a researcher can come closer to a truer understanding of the world 
(Harding, 1992). Qualitative traditions have long encouraged reflexive accounting of the 
complete process of studying a phenomenon, from the inception of a research question 
to the interpretation of findings, from theory building to theory testing, from the influence 
of the researcher on the phenomenon of study to the limitations of the study design. 
Data scientists are well-equipped to adopt this process of reflexive accountability, and, if 
they do so, their resulting conclusions would better represent, understand, and support 
the social world. Therefore, we propose shifting the conversation to be about 
explicitness in the data science research process, which would encompass both the 
emerging norms around transparency in data science and the reflexivity practices that 
have emerged in qualitative research. 
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5. Example Application 
 
For the sake of clarity, we have presented interpretivism, abduction, and reflexivity as 
distinct concepts. In reality, they are often entwined and mutually reinforcing in 
qualitative research. Interpretive insights are gained through an abductive process that 
integrates reflexive exercises. How does this look in practice? How could data science 
practitioners update their existing approaches with an eye for centering qualitative 
thinking—specifically by incorporating interpretivism, abductive reasoning, and 
reflexivity?  
 
5.1 Case Background 
 
We model practical steps to help integrate qualitative sensibilities into a data science 
project through a description of ongoing research conducted by two authors of this 
article and their collaborators (Dreier, Serrano, Gade & Smith, n.d.). The project asked, 
“How do government officials internally rationalize policies that violate the rights of their 
citizens?” During times of real, perceived, or constructed security crises, liberal 
democracies routinely deny rights protections to certain subsets of their citizenry, 
claiming those restrictions are necessary to maintain or re-establish national 
security.  Britain’s ``Troubles in Northern Ireland’’ provide an historical case in point. In 
an effort to quell escalating sectarian violence, and in impudent disregard for due-
process rights, Britain in 1971 authorized internment without trial for those suspected of 
violence. More than 1,800 nationalists were interned. Publicly, Britain rationalized 
internment as a necessary response to a dire security situation. But were these the true 
motivations for internment? How did officials internally rationalize these violations to 
themselves and their colleagues? To answer these questions, Dreier et al. (n.d.) 
consulted digitized archives of British Prime Ministers’ security-related correspondence 
during the early years of the Troubles (1969-73).  
 
5.2 Context on Methods 
 
Traditional means of analyzing historical collections involve painstaking qualitative 
coding procedures, which limit researchers to a relatively small universe of relevant 
documents but allow them to develop deep, textured, and complex understandings of 
the processes they study. Today, if the universe of relevant data exceeds a human 
coder’s reasonable capacity to qualitatively analyze it, the researcher can turn to 
computational text-analysis tools to automate the identification of concepts of interests 
within text. In doing so, researchers dramatically expand the amount of text they can 
analyze. However, this can come at the expense of nuance, interpretability, or 
recognition that policy processes take place within—and are shaped by—extended 
historical time periods (Rast 2012, p. 6; see also: Pierson, 2004).  
 
The rapidly evolving field of natural language processing (NLP) offers promising 
advances for computationally recognizing the complex, multi-faceted ideas that pervade 
the social world. NLP’s family of transformer-based approaches (e.g., BERT or 
RoBERTa) contextualize a word’s vector representation and are trained on hand-coded 
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data to accomplish a task. If and when NLP models achieve an acceptable level of 
agreement with human coders on a set of training data, the model could then be used to 
annotate the remaining unlabeled (‘held-out’) text in a corpus. Under the right 
circumstances, these models may be used to bring qualitative methods to scale while 
capturing some degree of complexity.   
 
In order for NLP model outputs to be useful, however, the researcher must develop 
contextually meaningful classification schemes (for annotating the training data), and 
even then, models are shaped by social contexts and biases built into language. 
Therefore, to most effectively implement NLP’s state-of-the-art technologies, Dreier et 
al. (n.d.) integrated interpretivist, abductive, and reflexive qualitative sensibilities into the 
NLP pipeline, particularly as the research team developed and coded for concepts that 
would later be used to train an NLP model. In this sense, this research approached NLP 
tools as augmenting and amplifying (rather than replacing) qualitative methods and 
thinking. 
 
5.3 Qualitative thinking to develop meaningful classification schemes 
 
Before turning to NLP, researchers must first develop the categories they are interested 
in examining, establish the boundaries between those categories, and code segments 
of the data according to those coding guidelines. However, identifying classification 
categories in real text is an inevitably complicated and subjective process. Concepts 
can be difficult to pinpoint and distinguish from one another. They are often only 
identifiable by a researcher who has detailed case-study knowledge. And the process of 
establishing and coding classification categories is shaped by researchers’ interpretive 
understanding of the case, their preconceived theoretical understandings of the 
concepts of interest, their methodological understandings about the relationship 
between temporal sequences and causation (Grzymala-Busse 2011), and how the 
researchers abductively update those understandings as directed by the evidence they 
observe.  
 
When used as the basis for an NLP automation, subjective coding decisions can 
substantially shape model outcomes and researcher conclusions. When coding text 
data for NLP implementation, therefore, we urge researchers to ground their work in 
qualitative sensibilities and to move away from the idea that they are ‘labelling’ true 
instances, instead embracing the idea that they are ‘coding’ carefully defined but 
inevitably subjective concepts. The exemplary research of Dreier et al. (n.d.) took the 
following steps to integrate interpretivism, abduction, and reflexivity into the process of 
developing and coding the concepts of interest in their study: 
 
Investing in case study knowledge to develop an interpretive intuition. Understanding 
that identifying and making inferences about rationalizations for internment in Northern 
Ireland was highly context-specific, Dreier et al. leveraged insights from interpretive 
methods, spending about three months mapping the conflict and developing an 
understanding about the context in which their archive data were created and 
curated. Archival data (like many text-based data sources) are unavoidably incomplete 
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(Decker, 2014), under-represent or omit certain actors (Decker, 2013), and often 
prioritize the worldviews of those in power (Stoler, 2008). By acknowledging these 
empirical realities, the study’s research team was able to consider the relative 
importance of different types of evidence, identify subtle clues in the data, discuss the 
potential directions of bias in the study’s analysis, and update the study’s coding 
ontology accordingly.  
 
Furthermore, the study team’s rich understanding of the case study allowed the 
researchers to interpret meaning and connect ideas that would have otherwise 
appeared unrelated, and to adapt the study’s coding scheme to include these 
connections. For example, the government in Northern Ireland initiated internment 
alongside banning public marches. A coder with detailed case-study knowledge of the 
sectarian conflict may recognize that those bans were directly related to internment: 
Northern Ireland banned marches (which would disproportionately affect Protestants) in 
an effort to prevent Catholics from feeling singularly targeted (by internment). Based on 
this understanding, Dreier et al. (n.d.) treated bans on marches as part of the 
government’s efforts to publicly rationalize internment.  
 
More broadly, understanding the historical processes of change through case study 
inquiry requires scholars to temper impulses to treat data points as ahistorical, 
generalizable demonstrations of causality. Instead, researchers should adopt an 
interpretative appreciation for how social processes occur over extended periods of time 
and are shaped by context-specific junctures and processes (Pierson 2004; Howlett and 
Jayner 2006; Rast 2012; Grzymala-Busse 2011). Indeed, Britain’s efforts to rationalize 
internment make little sense when interpreted outside the context of the post-World War 
II ‘liberal consensus’ that held states accountable to honoring individuals’ rights. 
 
Using an abductive approach to developing coding ontology. A purely deductive 
framework might encourage researchers to develop pre-defined categories and 
maintain those categories even if the data reveals flaws in that approach. Instead, the 
research team in Dreier et al. (n.d.) intentionally developed coding stages that allowed 
the team to abductively and systematically update the study’s coding categories—as 
indicated by the case study and data—before executing the bulk of coding. First, the 
researchers surveyed a sample of documents (to ground their intuitions) and then 
developed the study’s coding scheme. Next, the researchers coded a small subset of 
documents, carefully recording their coding decisions, judgements, uncertainties about 
boundaries between categories, unanticipated categories, and evident flaws in their 
assumptions. The study’s authors then modestly updated their classification categories 
based on these initial coding observations. 
 
Researchers will inevitably encounter their own blind spots as they begin coding new 
text data, and abductive approaches allow researchers to update their parameters 
accordingly. In the case of Dreier et al. (n.d.), the authors initially conflated political 
motivations for internment and military benefits of internment into one rationalization 
category representing the government’s strategic motivations for internment. By building 
abduction into their pipeline, Dreier et al. (n.d.) were able to update their categories 
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to distinguish between what became two of the most conflicting attitudes about 
internment’s necessity: political pressures to impose internment versus skepticism 
about its military advantages.  
 
Integrating reflexive tactics into coding and analysis. Dreier et al. (n.d.) maintained an 
extensive research journal (what they referred to as “field notes”) following each coding 
session. These field notes helped to identify changes in how the research team thought 
about categories, to identify potential disagreements between coders, to identify coding 
rules which were unclear, to note any individual biases or starting points that could 
shape how each coder uniquely reacted to a given piece of evidence, and to record 
textured observations about the case and relationships between variables of interest. 
These field notes became an invaluable source of data for the study’s substantive 
analysis; captured critical events, meta-shifts over time, and contextual meaning; 
allowed the research team to consider and confront their own biased reactions to the 
data; and yielded a methodological appendix that comprehensively detailed the study’s 
qualitative construction of quantitative data (a form of research transparency that is too 
often omitted in the publication process, to the detriment of downstream users and the 
scientific process).  
 
By adopting and carefully documenting the qualitative sensibilities of interpretivism, 
abductive reasoning, and reflexivity into this study’s coding pipeline, Dreier et al. (n.d.)  
accomplished at least four things that would have otherwise been impossible: updated 
the study’s coding scheme to meaningfully reflect the data and context; discerned the 
relative importance of different types of evidence; considered the potential biases in the 
research team’s analysis and reactions; and, ultimately, provided the study’s 
downstream NLP models with more accurate, systematically developed annotated data. 
(See Dreier and Gade (2021) for further details on a step-by-step process for 
incorporating interpretation, abduction, and reflection into a data science pipeline.) 
 
5.4 Acknowledging Biases 
 
We close discussion of the Troubles in Northern Ireland example by encouraging 
scholars implementing NLP (or data science tools in general) to broadly apply a critical 
qualitative lens to acknowledge the biases within the computational models they use. 
Language is complicated and constantly changing. Words and their meanings are 
idiosyncratic to an industry, geography, and time (‘IRA’ might refer to a retirement 
account in one text collection and a cadre of political and paramilitary groups in 
another). And how people use and interpret words is shaped by dominant or privileged 
voices in a given context. State-of-the-art NLP models adapt a word’s vector 
representation based on its context, but word vectors will inevitably retain social biases 
and other undesirable associations that are present in the text on which vectors are 
pretrained. It is not computationally feasible to fully address—or even fully discover—
these issues, and when used as starting points for NLP analysis, such associations run 
the risk of reinforcing social inequalities (Blodgett, Barocas, Daumé & Wallach, 2020; 
Bender, Gebru, Mcmillan-Major & Shmitchell, 2021; Sap et al. 2019).  
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These concerns are particularly salient to the corners of data science that analyze text 
data to map ideology, flag hate speech, contain the spread of misinformation, anticipate 
protests against injustice, or track plans for violence or insurrection. However, 
understanding that context shapes meaning, and that biases which reinforce privilege 
hide within our ‘objective’ data sources are concerns with which all data scientists must 
contend. Adopting qualitative sensibilities of interpretivism, abduction, and reflexivity will 
help position data scientists to take these concerns seriously by carefully re-considering 
their assumptions, qualifying their results, and attending to the possible biases 




We have argued that many of the current problems with data science as it is applied to 
the production of social knowledge could be mitigated through the integration of 
qualitative approaches. But qualitative ways of understanding the world have 
tremendous value beyond what they can do to systemize data science research 
practices. So let us be clear. We do not believe qualitative methods should be co-opted 
as the handmaiden (Hesse-Biber, 2010) of data science. Nor are we arguing for a 
qualitative methods toolbox that data scientists can casually dip into, deploying an 
interview or two here, some field observations there. While such dabbling may prove 
valuable in certain cases, we envision a more fundamental shift in the way we practice 
data science as it is applied to social research, so that certain qualitative sensibilities 
are substantively integrated into data-intensive social science. We have argued that, to 
integrate qualitative approaches in a manner not decoupled from the epistemological 
positions undergirding them, data science of social phenomena should draw on 
qualitative practices related to interpretivism, abductive reasoning, and reflexivity.   
Although we have demonstrated certain ways in which these sensibilities are 
compatible with trends and norms in data science, we also realize that their integration 
into data science practice will likely encounter some friction. For example, we described 
an intensive process of iterative coding and dialogue among qualitative researchers 
engaged in grounded theory development. Such a method can result in less biased and 
more nuanced findings but does not necessarily lend itself to being reproduced—a gold 
standard for data science research. One could rightly argue that the naive ‘labeling’ of 
training data with which we contrasted the grounded theory coding approach is also not 
reproducible. But it is worth acknowledging more broadly that qualitative research 
typically aspires toward justifiability of findings rather than reproducibility or replicability 
of methods precisely because it is geared toward understanding the nuances of 
particular social contexts rather than producing universal claims. We do not recommend 
that data science abandon its invaluable commitment to reproducibility any more than 
we would advise surrendering the nuanced accuracy that qualitative sensibilities can 
uniquely generate. Rather, data scientists must evaluate the tradeoffs between 
contextual integrity, reproducibility, and scalability to determine the appropriate 
approach for any given project. This does not mean defanging data science. To the 
contrary, Leonelli (2021) has compellingly argued that data science could be rendered 
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more incisive if coupled with qualitative approaches. Assessing the role of data science 
in understanding COVID-19, Leonelli argues that data scientists can inform a more 
tailored, effective, and sustainable response to the pandemic by eschewing a narrow 
focus on predictive models and embracing investigations into the relationships between 
disease and socio-environmental conditions within localized contexts—inquiries that 
necessitate the inclusion of qualitative questions, qualitative data, and qualitative 
expertise.    
While we have discussed data science as applied to the production of social knowledge, 
the main problems that we highlight—including de-contextualized data, hidden biases, 
and an uncritical approach to research topics—are also present in data science that is 
not applied to the production of knowledge about the social world. Our focus has been 
on applications in the social domain due to our own interests and expertise, but our 
argument could no doubt be further extended. For instance, data in medicine and 
biology is systematically biased, and researchers in those and other fields may also 
benefit from a more humanistic approach (Stevens, Wehrens, & De Bont, 2018). AI and 
machine learning programs, such as recommender systems, which arguably do not 
produce ‘social knowledge’ per se, or at least are not oriented towards intelligibly 
producing social knowledge of the sort found in the social sciences, have been one of 
the central objects of critique recently in critical data studies (Benjamin, 2019; Noble, 
2018). Even problems in areas as far afield as physics, pure mathematics, geology, or 
astronomy are heavily influenced by the positionality of the individuals researching 
them, and hence would benefit greater reflexivity. Exploring the potential for the 
integration of qualitative sensibilities across these various veins of work is an exciting 
direction for future work.    
To be sure, qualitative research encompasses a heterogeneous set of approaches, and 
there is a difference between adopting sensibilities and radically changing the 
methodological approaches of data science. The gap between practicing data analytics 
and undertaking an ethnography, for example, is significant, and we are not suggesting 
that all data scientists should (or could) become ethnographers. Instead, we have 
argued that the ‘sensibilities’ of ethnography and other qualitative methods can 
influence how questions are formulated, how findings are interpreted, and how 
implications are framed, and that some aspects of qualitative methods themselves can 
be integrated into the data science research pipeline. We allow that there is a spectrum 
in terms of how deeply interpretivism, abduction, and reflexivity may be taken up in data 
science and how robust the relationship between data science and qualitative traditions 
might become. At one end of the spectrum, formal exposure to qualitative sensibilities 
can, at the very least, help illuminate how qualitative thinking is always already implicit 
at various stages of data science research—from determining that a research question 
is salient, to defining variables, to drawing conclusions from patterns in the data—even 
if that fact typically goes unrecognized in quantitative analyses (Meng, 2016). 
Qualitative sensibilities can be deployed to systematize qualitative thinking inherent in 
data science, making it more ‘methodical’ so to speak and better equipped to accurately 
quantify the social world. At the other end of the spectrum, earnestly engaging with 
qualitative sensibilities could fundamentally alter the approach to data science research 
and result in a true blending of quantitative computational and qualitative methods. 
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Here, inspiration can be drawn from work Ograjenšek and Gal (2016) have done to 
reimagine statistical education in a way that is unshackled from a narrow range of 
analytical techniques and reoriented toward a “need to know.” In this scenario, 
researchers would deploy the modes of thinking and analysis best suited to answering a 
question of interest, whether those methods be derived from qualitative or quantitative 
traditions:   
[Q]ualitative and quantitative data and research methods should not be seen as 
mutually exclusive enterprises. They should be perceived as building blocks that 
co-exist under the larger umbrella of research. (Ograjenšek & Gal, 2016) 
 
We similarly suggest that qualitative and quantitative approaches should not merely be 
‘mixed’ but should be considered as complementary and co-constitutive elements of 
producing social knowledge through data science. Such an approach can improve data 
science by tempering its findings, surfacing its modes of failure, and adding nuance to 
its intellectual contributions. It can also allow data science to ask new and different 
questions in the first place. We have focused on relatively circumscribed methodological 
innovations in data science, rather than the kinds of radical shifts called for by authors 
such as Catherine D’Ignazio and Lauren Klein (2020) and Sasha Costanza-Chock 
(2020), or projects such as Erase the Database (“Erase the Database,” n.d.) and Our 
Data Bodies (“Our Data Bodies,” n.d.)—all of which explicitly center emancipatory 
perspectives like anti-racism and intersectional feminism. We offer relatively more 
revisionist suggestions, not because we do not support the same goals (we do), but 
because we believe that today’s data scientists could readily adopt the incremental 
shifts we outlined here, and that the training and experience required to make these 
changes will help lay the groundwork for more transformative work.  
As a starting point, qualitative scholars must be welcomed into conversations about how 
the academic community trains future generations of data scientists. And, at the very 
least, data scientists must be conversant enough in qualitative sensibilities and the 
subjective realities of knowledge production in order to understand the strengths and 
limitations of both quantitative and qualitative methods, to know when qualitative 
approaches are appropriate, and to collaborate with experts in qualitative research to 
improve and expand their ability to understand the social world. This means that our 
current data revolution necessitates not only cultivating increased capacity in 
quantitative and computational programs, but also building up qualitative research in 
social science and humanities departments rather than continuing to disinvest from 
them—a troubling side-effect of the data-driven turn in the academy. Such an 
investment will bear the fruit of data science research that is more reliable, ethical, and 
meaningful. 
Disclosure Statement  
Ongoing NLP research on Northern Ireland discussed within this article was conducted 
at the University of Washington by Sarah K. Dreier, Sofia Serrano, Emily K. Gade, and 
Noah A. Smith, in affiliation with the Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
Just Acc pted
and developed during the eScience Institute’s Data Science Incubator Program. This 
project was funded by National Science Foundation Law and Social Science Award 
#1823547, “Civil Rights Violations and the Democratic Rule of Law” (Emily K. Gade, 
Principal Investigator, with co-PIs Michael McCann and Noah Smith). 
 
Acknowledgements 
This paper began with a workshop convened by the Data Science Studies Special 
Interest Group and the Qualitative Multi-Method Initiative (QUAL) at the University of 
Washington in January 2019 titled “Qualitative Methods for Data Science: Advancing 
Curriculum and Collaboration.” We thank the following individuals for their participation: 
Cecilia Aragon, Onur Bikaner, Dharma Dailey, Megan Finn, Emilia Gan, Stuart Geiger, 
Bernease Herman, Shana Hirsch, Andrew Hoffman, Charles Kiene, Saadia Pekkanen, 
and James Phuong. We appreciate feedback we received on a very early draft of this 
essay from Onur Bikaner, Dharma Dailey, Shana Hirsch, Saadia Pekkanen, Ariel 
Rokem, and James Phuong, and the insightful comments and constructive advice 
provided by two anonymous reviewers. Their contributions greatly improved our 
arguments, and any remaining errors or shortcomings are our own.  
 
References 
ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (ACM FAccT). (n.d.). 
https://facctconference.org/ 
Agre, P. (1997). Toward a critical technical practice: Lessons learned in trying to reform 
AI. In G. C. Bowker, L. Gasser, S. L. Star, & W. Turner (Eds.), Social science, technical 
systems, and cooperative work : Bridging the great divide. Earlbaum Associates Inc. 
Alexander, M. (2012). The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of 
colorblindness. New York: The New Press. 
Anderson, C. (2008, June 23). The end of theory: The data deluge makes the scientific 
method obsolete. Wired. Retrieved from http://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory/ 
Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S., & Kirchner, L. (2016, May 23). Machine bias: There’s 
software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it’s biased against 
blacks. ProPublica. Retrieved from https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
Barbour, R. S. (2013). Quality of data analysis. In U. Flick (Ed.), The Sage handbook of 
qualitative data analysis (pp. 496–509). London: Sage. 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243.n34 
Just Accepted
Barocas, S., Biega, A. J., Fish, B., Stark, L., & Niklas, J. (2020). When not to design, 
build, or deploy. In Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, 
and Transparency (FAT* ’20). ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095 
Basta, C., Costa-Jussà, M. R., & Casas, N. (2019). Evaluating the underlying gender 
bias in contextualized word embeddings. In Proceedings of the First Workshop on 
Gender Bias in Natural Language Processing (pp. 33–39). Retrieved from 
http://data.statmt.org/ 
Bates, J. (2018). Data cultures, power and the city. In R. Kitchin, T. P. Lauriault, & G. 
McArdle (Eds.), Data and the city. New York: Routledge. 
Bates, J., Cameron, D., Checco, A., Clough, P., Hopfgartner, F., Mazumdar, S., … de la 
Vega de León, A. (2020). Integrating fate/critical data studies into data science 
curricula: Where are we going and how do we get there? FAT* 2020 - Proceedings of 
the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 425–435. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372832 
Bender, E. M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A., & Shmitchell, S. (2021). On the dangers 
of stochastic parrots: Can language models be too big? In Conference on Fairness, 
Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT ’21), March 3–10, 2021, Virtual Event, 
Canada. https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922 
 
Benjamin, R. (2019). Race after technology. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Blank, G., & Lutz, C. (2017). Representativeness of social media in Great Britain: 
Investigating Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Pinterest, Google+, and Instagram. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 61(7), 741–756. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764217717559 
Blodgett, S. L., Barocas, S., Daumé III, H., & Wallach, H. (2020). Language 
(technology) is power: A critical survey of “bias” in NLP. arXiv:2005.14050 [cs.CL]. 
 
Bolukbasi, T., Chang, K. W., Zou, J., Saligrama, V., & Kalai, A. (2016). Man is to 
computer programmer as woman is to homemaker? Debiasing word embeddings. 
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 4356–4364. 
Bowker, G. C., & Star, S. L. (2000). Sorting things out: Classification and its 
consequences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Boyd, D., & Crawford, K. (2012). Critical questions for big data. Information, 
Communication & Society, 15(5), 662–679. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2012.678878 
Brinkmann, S., & Steiner, K. (2018). Doing interviews (2nd ed.). London: Sage. 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781529716665 
Brookshire, B. (2016, October 21). Blame bad incentives for bad science. Science 
News. Retrieved from https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/scicurious/blame-bad-
incentives-bad-science 
Just Accepted
Burke, M., & Kraut, R. (2013). Using Facebook after losing a job: Differential benefits of 
strong and weak ties. In Proceedings of the 2013 Conference on Computer Supported 
Cooperative Work (CSCW ’13) (pp. 1419–1430). ACM. 
Burns, R. (2015). Rethinking big data in digital humanitarianism: practices, 
epistemologies, and social relations. GeoJournal, 80(4), 477–490. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10708-014-9599-x 
Burns, R., Dalton, C. M., & Thatcher, J. E. (2018). Critical data, critical technology in 
theory and practice. The Professional Geographer, 70(1), 126–128. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00330124.2017.1325749 
Caliskan, A., Bryson, J. J., & Narayanan, A. (2017). Semantics derived automatically 
from language corpora contain human-like biases. Science, 356, 183–186. Retrieved 
from http://science.sciencemag.org/ 
Cao, L. (2017). Data science: Challenges and directions. Communications of the ACM, 
Vol. 60(8), 59–68. 
Carson, D. (2009). The abduction of Sherlock Holmes. International Journal of Police 
Science and Management, 11(2), 193–202. 
Charmaz, K. (2000). Grounded theory: Objectivist and constructivist methods. In N. K. 
Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed.). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Clarke, A. E. (2003). Situational analyses: Grounded theory mapping after the 
postmodern turn. Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction, 26(4), 553–576. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/si.2003.26.4.553 
Coffey, A., & Atkinson, P. (1996). Making sense of qualitative data: Complementary 
research strategies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Colaner, S. (2020, June 12). AI weekly: AI phrenology is racist nonsense, so of course it 
doesn’t work. Venture Beat. Retrieved from https://venturebeat.com/2020/06/12/ai-
weekly-ai-phrenology-is-racist-nonsense-so-of-course-it-doesnt-work/ 
Costanza-Chock, S. (2020). Design justice: Community-led practice to build the worlds 
we need. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Crawford, K. (2013, April 1). The hidden biases in big data. Harvard Business Review. 
Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data 
D’Ignazio, C., & Klein, L. F. (2020). Data feminism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Davey, M., Kirchgaessner, S., & Boseley, S. (2020, June 3). Surgisphere: Governments 
and WHO changed COVID-19 policy based on suspect data from tiny US company. The 
Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/03/covid-19-
surgisphere-who-world-health-organization-hydroxychloroquine 
Just A c pted
Day, S. (2012). A reflexive lens: Exploring dilemmas of qualitative methodology through 
the concept of reflexivity. Qualitative Sociology Review, 8(1), 61–84. 
De Veaux, R. D., Agarwal, M., Averett, M., Baumer, B. S., Bray, A., Bressoud, T. C., … 
Ye, P. (2017). Curriculum guidelines for undergraduate programs in data science. 
Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application, 4(1), 15–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-statistics-060116-053930 
Decker, S. (2013). The silence of the archives: Business history, post-colonialism and 
archival ethnography. Management & Organizational History, 8(2), 155–173. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17449359.2012.761491 
Decker, S. (2014). Solid intentions: An archival ethnography of corporate architecture 
and organizational remembering. Organization, 21(4), 514–542. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1350508414527252 
Douven, I. (2011). Abduction. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abduction/ 
Dreier, S., Serrano, S., Gade, E., & Smith, N. (n.d). Troubles in text: Finetuning NLP to 
recognize government rationalizations for rights abuses (Working paper). 
Dreier, S. & Gade, E. (2021). Qualitative sensibilities for data science research pipeline. 
https://www.skdreier.com/uploads/7/5/0/0/75005149/qual_data_science_pipeline.pdf 
 
Dumit, J., & Nafus, D. (2018). The other ninety per cent: Thinking with data science, 
creating data studies - an interview with Joseph Dumit. In H. Knox & D. Nafus (Eds.), 
Ethnography for a data-saturated world (pp. 252–274). Manchester University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526127600.00020 
Erase the Database. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://erasethedatabase.com/ 
Eubanks, V. (2018). Automating inequality: How high-tech tools profile, police, and 
punish the poor. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Evans, M., & Mathews, A. W. (2019, October 25). Researchers find racial bias in 
hospital algorithm. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/researchers-find-racial-bias-in-hospital-algorithm-
11571941096 
Freelon, D. (2014). On the interpretation of digital trace data in communication and 
social computing research. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 58(1), 59–75. 
Gangadharan, S. P., & Niklas, J. (2019). Decentering technology in discourse on 
discrimination. Information Communication and Society, 22(7), 882–899. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2019.1593484 
Garg, N., Schiebinger, L., Jurafsky, D., & James, Z. (2018). Word embeddings quantify 
100 years of gender and ethnic stereotypes. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Just Accep d
Sciences of the United States of America, 115(16), E3635–E3644. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1720347115 
Geiger, R. S., & Halfaker, A. (2017). Operationalizing conflict and cooperation between 
automated software agents in Wikipedia: A replication and expansion of “Even Good 
Bots Fight.” Proceedings of ACM Human-Computer Interaction, 1(2), 49. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3134684 
Geiger, R. S., & Ribes, D. (2011). Trace ethnography: Following coordination through 
documentary practices. In 44th Hawaii International Conference on System Science. 
IEEE. 
Geiger, R. S., Yu, K., Yang, Y., Dai, M., Qiu, J., Tang, R., & Huang, J. (2020). Garbage 
in, garbage out? Do machine learning application papers in social computing report 
where human-labeled training data comes from? Proceedings of the 2020 Conference 
on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* 2020), 325–336. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372862 
Gitelman, L. (Ed.). (2013). “Raw data” is an oxymoron. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Glaser, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for 
qualitative research. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Goldberg, A. (2015). In defense of forensic social science. Big Data & Society, Jul-Dec, 
1–3. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951715601145 
Gonen, H., & Goldberg, Y. (2019). Lipstick on a pig: Debiasing methods cover up 
systematic gender biases in word embeddings but do not remove them. ArXiv Preprint.  
arXiv:1903.03862 
Goss, E., Hu, L., Sabin, M., & Teeple, S. (2020). Manifesting the sociotechnical: 
Experimenting with methods for social context and social justice. In Proceedings of the 
2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* ’20). ACM. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3375682 
Granville, K. (2018, March 19). Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What you need to 
know as fallout widens. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-
explained.html 
Grzymala-Busse, A. (2011). Time will tell? Temporality and the analysis of causal 
mechanisms and processes. Comparative Political Studies, 44(9), 1267-1297.  
Hahn, C., Hoffman, A. S., Slota, S. C., Inman, S., & Ribes, D. (2018). Entangled 
inversions: Actor/analyst symmetry in the ethnography of infrastructure. Interaction 
Design and Architecture(S), 38, 124–139. 
Haraway, D. J. (1989). Primate visions: Gender, race, and nature in the world of modern 
science. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall. 
Just ccepted
Harding, S. (1992). Rethinking standpoint epistemology: What is “strong objectivity”? 
The Centennial Review, 36(3), 437–470. 
Hargittai, E. (2015). Is bigger always better? Potential biases of big data derived from 
social network sites. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 659(1), 63–76. 
Hargittai, E. (2020). Potential biases in big data: Omitted voices on social media. Social 
Science Computer Review, 38(1), 10–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439318788322 
Haskins, C. (2019, February 9). Dozens of cities have secretly experimented with 
predictive policing software. Vice Motherboard. Retrieved from 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/d3m7jq/dozens-of-cities-have-secretly-
experimented-with-predictive-policing-software 
Hesse-Biber, S. (2010). Qualitative approaches to mixed methods practice. Qualitative 
Inquiry, 16(6), 455–468. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800410364611 
Hey, T., Tansley, S., & Tolle, K. (Eds.). (2009). The fourth paradigm: Data-intensive 
scientific discovery. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Research. Retrieved from 
http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/collaboration/fourthparadigm/ 
Hill, M. B., & Shaw, A. (2020). Studying populations of online communities. In B. 
Foucault Welles & S. Gonzalez-Bailon (Eds.), The handbook of networked 
communication (pp. 173–193). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190460518.013.8 
Howlett, M., & Rayner, J. (2006). Understanding the historical turn in the policy 
sciences: A critique of stochastic, narrative, path dependency and process-sequencing 
models of policy-making over time. Policy Sciences, 39(1), 1–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/sl  
Iliadis, A., & Russo, F. (2016). Critical data studies: An introduction. Big Data & Society, 
Jul-Dec, 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951716674238 
Jungherr, A. (2019). Normalizing digital trace data. In N. J. Stroud & S. C. McGregor 
(Eds.), Digital discussions: How big data informs political communication (pp. 9–35). 
New York, NY: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351209434-2 
Jungherr, A., Schoen, H., Posegga, O., & Jürgens, P. (2017). Digital trace data in the 
study of public opinion: An indicator of attention toward politics rather than political 
support. Social Science Computer Review, 35(3), 336–356. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439316631043 
Kaeser-Chen, C., Dubois, E., Schüür, F., & Moss, E. (2020). Translation tutorial: 
Positionality-aware machine learning. In Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on 
Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* ’20). ACM. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3375666 
Just Accepted
Knorr Cetina, K. (1999). Epistemic cultures: How the sciences make knowledge. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Lazer, D., Pentland, A., Adamic, L., Aral, S., Barabási, A.-L., Brewer, D., … Van 
Alstyne, M. (2009). Computational social science. Science, 323, 721–723. 
Leonelli, S. (2014). What difference does quantity make? On the epistemology of Big 
Data in biology. Big Data & Society, Apr-Jun, 1–11. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951714534395 
Leonelli, S. (2021). Data Science in Times of Pan(dem)ic. Harvard Data Science 
Review, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1162/99608f92.fbb1bdd6 
Leurs, K. (2017). Feminist data studies: Using digital methods for ethical, reflexive and 
situated socio-cultural research. Feminist Review, 115(1), 130–154. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41305-017-0043-1 
Lewis, S. C., & Molyneux, L. (2018). A decade of research on social media and 
journalism: Assumptions, blind spots, and a way forward. Media and Communication, 
6(4), 11–23. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v6i4.1562 
Lindgren, S. (2020). Data theory. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Marconi, F., Daldrup, T., & Pant, R. (2019, February 14). Acing the algorithmic beat, 
journalism’s next frontier. Nieman Lab. Retrieved from 
https://www.niemanlab.org/2019/02/acing-the-algorithmic-beat-journalisms-next-frontier/ 
Marcus, G., & Davis, E. (2014, April 6). Eight (no, nine!) problems with big data (Op-Ed). 
The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/opinion/eight-no-nine-problems-with-big-data.html 
Markham, A. N. (2017). Reflexivity: Some techniques for interpretive researchers. 
Annettemarkham.Com. Retrieved from https://annettemarkham.com/2017/02/reflexivity-
for-interpretive-researchers/ 
Marres, N. (2021). For a situational analytics: An interpretative methodology for the 
study of situations in computational settings. Big Data & Society, Jul-Dec, 1–16. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951720949571 
Mauthner, N. S., & Doucet, A. (2003). Reflexive accounts and accounts of reflexivity in 
qualitative data analysis. Sociology, 37(3), 413–431. 
Mayer-Schönberger, V., & Cukier, K. (2013). Big data: A revolution that will transform 
how we live, work and think. London: John Murray.  
Mayer, K., & Malik, M. M. (2019). Critical data scientists at work: Summary report of the 
ICWSM-2019 Workshop on Critical Data Science. Retrieved from https://critical-data-
science.github.io/ 
Jus  Acc pted
Mayo, D. (2020). P-values on trial: Selective reporting of (best practice guides against) 
selective reporting. Harvard Data Science Review, 2(1) 1–22. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/99608f92.e2473f6a 
Mellon, J., & Prosser, C. (2017). Twitter and Facebook are not representative of the 
general population: Political attitudes and demographics of British social media users. 
Research and Politics, 4(3), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017720008 
Meng, X.-L. (2016). Discussion: The Q-q dynamic for deeper learning and research. 
International Statistical Review, 84(2), 181–189. https://doi.org/10.1111/insr.12151 
Meng, X.-L. (2021). What are the values of data, data science, or data scientists? 
Harvard Data Science Review, 3(1), 2021. https://doi.org/10.1162/99608f92.ee717cf7 
Miller, H. J. (2010). The data avalanche is here. Shouldn’t we be digging? Journal of 
Regional Science, 50(1), 181–201. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9787.2009.00641.x 
Mittelstadt, B. D., Allo, P., Taddeo, M., Wachter, S., & Floridi, L. (2016). The ethics of 
algorithms: Mapping the debate. Big Data & Society, 3(2) 1–21. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951716679679 
Moats, D., & Seaver, N. (2019). ‘“You social scientists love mind games”’: 
Experimenting in the ‘“divide”’ between data science and critical algorithm studies. Big 
Data & Society, 6(1), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951719833404 
Moss, E., Chowdhury, R., Rakova, B., Schmer-Galunder, S., Binns, R., & Smart, A. 
(2019). Machine behaviour is old wine in new bottles. Nature, 574(176). 
National Institute of Justice. (2019). Real-time crime forcasting challenge. Retrieved 
from https://nij.ojp.gov/funding/real-time-crime-forecasting-challenge 
National Science Foundation. (2019). Harnessing the data revolution. Retrieved from 
https://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/big_ideas/harnessing.jsp 
Neff, G., Tanweer, A., Fiore-Gartland, B., & Osburn, L. (2017). Critique and contribute: 
A practice-based framework for improving critical data studies and data science. Big 
Data, 5(2), 85–97. https://doi.org/10.1089/big.2016.0050 
Nelson, L. K. (2020). Computational grounded theory: A methodological framework. 
Sociological Methods & Research, 49(1), 3–42. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124117729703 
Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of oppression: How search engines reinforce racism. 
Algorithms of Oppression. New York: New York University Press.  
Nosek, B. A., Alter, G., Banks, G. C., Borsboom, D., Bowman, S. D., Breckler, S. J., … 
Yarkoni, T. (2015). Promoting an open research culture. Science, 348(6242), 1422–
1425. 
Ju  A cepted
O’Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of math destruction: How big data increases inequality and 
threatens democracy. New York: Crown Publishing Group. 
Offenhuber, D. (2018). Sticky data: Context and friction in the use of urban data proxies. 
In R. Kitchin, T. P. Lauriault, & G. McArdle (Eds.), Data and the city (pp. 99–108). New 
York: Routledge. 
Ograjenšek, I., & Gal, I. (2016). Enhancing statistics education by including qualitative 
research. International Statistical Review, 84(2), 165–178. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/insr.12158 
Our Data Bodies. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.odbproject.org/ 
Parry, M. (2018, March 4). Data scientists in demand: New programs train students to 
make honest sense of numbers. The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Rush-to-Ride/242674 
Peirce, C. S. (2013). Quote from “Harvard lectures on pragmatism: Lecture VII, a 
deleted passage” [1903]. In Commens: Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce. Retrieved 
from http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-harvard-lectures-pragmatism-
lecture-vii-deleted-passage 
Pentland, A. (2014). Social physics: How good ideas spread-the lessons from a new 
science. New York: Penguin Press.  
Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Pink, S., & Lanzeni, D. (2018). Future anthropology ethics and datafication: Temporality 
and responsibility in research. Social Media + Society, Apr-Jun, 1–9. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305118768298 
Pink, S., Lanzeni, D., & Horst, H. (2018). Data anxieties: Finding trust in everyday digital 
mess. Big Data & Society, 5(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951718756685 
Pink, S., Ruckenstein, M., Willim, R., & Duque, M. (2018). Broken data: Conceptualising 
data in an emerging world. Big Data & Society, 5(1), 1–13. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951717753228 
PREM 15/479: Internal situation in Northern Ireland: Part 8 (1971 Aug 15-1971 Sep 03). 
(n.d.). Retrieved from https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C11024285 
Rast, J. (n.d.). Why history (still) matters: Time and temporality in urban political 
analysis. Urban Affairs Review, 48(1), 3–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087411418178 
Reichertz, J. (2010). Abduction: the logic of discovery of grounded theory. Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research, 11(1). 
Just Accep ed
Resnyansky, L. (2019). Conceptual frameworks for social and cultural Big Data 
analytics: Answering the epistemological challenge. Big Data & Society, 6(1), 1–12. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951718823815 
Ribes, D. (2019). STS, meet data science, once again. Science, Technology, & Human 
Values, 44(3), 514–539. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243918798899 
Richardson, R., & Kramer, H. E. (2006). Abduction as the type of inference that 
characterizes the development of a grounded theory. Qualitative Research, 6(4), 497–
513. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468794106068019 
Richterich, A. (2018). The big data agenda: Data ethics and critical data studies. 
London: University of Westminster Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv5vddsw 
Rosenberg, A. (2015). Philosophy of Social Science (5th ed.). Avalon Publishing. 
Sack, W. (2019). Rhetoric. In The software arts (pp. 145–202). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Saldaña, J. (2009). The coding manual for qualitative researchers. London: Sage. 
Sap, M., Card, D., Gabriel, S., Choi, Y., & Smith, N. A. (2019). The risk of racial bias in 
hate speech detection. In Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association for 
Computational Linguistics (pp. 1668–1678). Association for Computational Linguistics. 
Retrieved from https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/P19-1163/ 
Selbst, A. D., Friedler, S. A., Venkatasubramanian, S., Vertesi, J., Boyd, D., & 
Venkatasubrama, S. (2019). Fairness and abstraction in sociotechnical systems. In 
Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency 
(FAT* ’19) (pp. 59–68). Atlanta, GA. https://doi.org/10.1145/3287560.3287598 
Sloane, M., & Moss, E. (2019). AI’s social sciences deficit. Nature Machine Intelligence, 
1(8), 330–331. 
Song, I.-Y., & Zhu, Y. (2017). Big data and data science: Opportunities and challenges 
of iSchools. Journal of Data and Information Science, 2(3), 1–18. 
https://doi.org/10.1515/jdis-2017-0011 
Stevens, M., Wehrens, R., & De Bont, A. (2018). Conceptualizations of Big Data and 
their epistemological claims in healthcare: A discourse analysis. Big Data & Society, 
5(2) Jul-Dec, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951718816727 
Stoler, A. (2008). Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common 
Sense. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Stone, A. (2017, March). When big data gets it wrong. Government Technology 
(Govtech). Retrieved from https://www.govtech.com/data/When-Big-Data-Gets-It-
Wrong.html 
Just Accepted
Tanweer, A., Fiore-Gartland, B., & Aragon, C. (2016). Impediment to insight to 
innovation: Understanding data assemblages through the breakdown–repair process. 
Information, Communication & Society, 19(6), 736–752. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1153125 
Tate, E. (2017, March 15). Data analytics programs take off. Inside Higher Ed. 
Retrieved from https://www.insidehighered.com/digital-learning/article/2017/03/15/data-
analytics-programs-taking-colleges 
Taylor, L., & Purtova, N. (2019). What is responsible and sustainable data science? Big 
Data & Society, 6(2), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951719858114 
Thatcher, J. (2014). Living on fumes: Digital footprints, data fumes, and the limitations of 
spatial big data. International Journal of Communication, 8(1), 1765–1783. 
Thornberg, R., & Charmaz, K. (2013). Grounded theory and theoretical coding. In U. 
Flick (Ed.), The Sage handbook of qualitative data analysis (pp. 153–170). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446282243 
Tsvetkova, M., García-Gavilanes, R., Floridi, L., & Yasseri, T. (2017). Even good bots 
fight: The case of Wikipedia. PLOS One, 12(2). 
United States Executive Office of the President. (2014). Big data: Seizing opportunities, 
preserving values. Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_5.1.14_fina
l_print.pdf 
van Atteveldt, W., & Peng, T. Q. (2018). When communication meets computation: 
Opportunities, challenges, and pitfalls in computational communication science. 
Communication Methods and Measures, 12(2–3), 81–92. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19312458.2018.1458084 
Vigen, T. (2015). Spurious correlations. Hachette Books.  
Wagner-Pacifici, R., Mohr, J. W., & Breiger, R. L. (2015). Ontologies, methodologies, 
and new uses of Big Data in the social and cultural sciences. Big Data & Society, 2(2), 
1–11. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053951715613810 
Wan, E., de Groot, A., Jameson, S., Păun, M., Lücking, P., Klumbyte, G., & Lämmerhirt, 
D. (2020). Lost in Translation: An interactive workshop mapping interdisciplinary 
translations for epistemic justice. In Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, 
Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* ’20). ACM. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3375685 
Zook, M., Barocas, S., Boyd, D., Crawford, K., Keller, E., Gangadharan, S. P., … 
Pasquale, F. (2017). Ten simple rules for responsible big data research. PLoS 
Computational Geography, 13(3). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005399 
 
 
Just cce t d
 
 
Just Accepted
